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Opting out of Blueprints? The fate of Emissions Trading in Kazakhstan  
as a lesson for international climate policy 
Lyazzat Nugumanova and Manuela Troschke 
Emissions trading system (ETS) as an instrument to induce emission reductions in the private sector are largely 
favoured by economic literature and financed by international organizations. National ETS is the first step towards 
international emission trading, and it allows to report fix amounts of future reductions in worldwide climate scenarios 
and climate treaties. However, an ETS is not the only option to cope with emission reduction, and blueprints do not 
fit them all. Kazakhstan, which in 2013 was the first country among the post-Soviet states to implement an ETS, 
suspended ETS in February, 2016. Considering the challenges of the ETS in Kazakhstan in country context, we argue 
that a carbon tax could be a better option. A tax provides price certainty for business, less transaction costs, and a 
potential double dividend for the environment and the economy if revenues are wisely spent. National autonomy and 
international obligations are not inconsistent, as the experience of other countries shows. 
 
 
Introduction 
Kazakhstan is amongst the world’s most carbon and 
energy intensive economies. Abundance of energy re-
sources and subsidized energy prices are some of the 
reasons for the highly energy intensive economy in Ka-
zakhstan. However, Kazakhstan’s CO2 emissions in-
tensity per GDP (PPP) has been declining over the last 
two decades, even though, the country has still a higher 
CO2 emissions intensity than China, Germany and the 
EU, as figure 1 shows.  
According to the United Nations Framework on Cli-
mate Change Convention (UNFCCC), in 2012 overall 
green-house gas emissions (GHG) emissions in tons 
of CO2 equivalent reached 283.5 million tons CO2 
equiv. with-out land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) in Kazakhstan. CO2 is the major source of 
GHG in Kazakhstan, and accounted for around 78% of 
total GHG emissions in 2012. In sector perspective, 
the largest contributor of GHG emissions is the energy 
sector which accounts for 85% of total GHG emissions 
(Figure 2).  
 
 
 
There is generally a large potential for carbon mitigation 
especially in the energy sector. The power generation 
technology and infrastructure is outdated and coal is 
largely used in power and heat production. 
Figure 1: CO2 emission per GDP (PPP) China, Kazakhstan, 
Germany and the EU 
 
Source: Own illustration based on World Bank Data.
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Figure 2: GHG emissions by sector (without LULUCF) 
in Kazakhstan, 2012 
 
Kazakhstan has developed its climate policy including 
commitments to international climate agreements, na-
tional green growth strategy and programs of sustainable 
development. Advised and financed by international or-
ganizations and donors, an ETS has been set up, na-
tional emission reduction targets have been determined, 
and quotas of allowed emissions have been allocated to 
enterprises based on National Allocation Plans. Accord-
ing to the UNFCCC, Kazakhstan communicated the fol-
lowing Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC): An economy-wide absolute reduction, starting 
from a base year 
 Unconditional target: 15% reduction in GHG emis-
sions by 2030 compared to the 1990 base year 
level 
 Conditional target: 25% reduction in GHG emis-
sions by 2030 compared to the 1990 level, subject 
to additional investments, access to low carbon 
technologies transfer mechanism etc.  
 
In February 2016, after two phases of the ETS and with 
a revision of the National Allocation Plan 2016-2020 
pending, Kazakhstan announced the suspension of the 
ETS until 2018. A. Magauov, vice-minister of Energy of 
Republic of Kazakhstan (RK) mentioned that the existing 
ETS in Kazakhstan has still many shortcomings that 
need to be addressed. He emphasized that industry 
groups raised their concern that the economy of Kazakh-
stan is expanding, electricity production is increasing, 
and emission quotas that have been allocated to them 
do not account for these factors. Therefore, it was offi-
cially proposed that a new methodology of ETS should 
be developed.  
This line of argumentation cast doubts on the ETS as 
a solution to emission reduction a la carte in Kazakh-
stan and demonstrates the decisive role of veto groups 
or veto players in the political bargaining process 
around carbon pricing. Factors driving or constraining 
the behavior of these actors will be in the focus of our 
discussion. 
Overview of the ETS in Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan was the first post-Soviet country to have 
launched an ETS as a policy tool to meet its emission 
targets and to contribute to climate change reduction. 
Kazakhstan introduced amendments to the country’s 
“Ecological Code” and additions to the environmental 
legislation, including government decrees and ministerial 
orders to implement an ETS.  
The Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
namely the Climate Change Department and JSC “Zhasyl 
Damu”, are the main authorized state institutions to over-
see the ETS. JSC Caspiy Commodity Exchange serves 
as a trading platform (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: ETS Kazakhstan: institutional infrastructure 
Ministry of Energy of  
Republic of Kazakhstan 
Regulation activity 
Department of Climate 
Change under Ministry of 
Energy RK 
Management of permits, development 
of national allocation plans, rules on 
emissions allowance quotas, organiza-
tion of emissions registry, accreditation 
of independent verifiers etc. 
JSC “Zhasyl Damu” Allowance registry 
JSC Caspiy Commodity 
Exchange 
Trading platform 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the first two phases of the 
ETS in Kazakhstan. A pilot phase of the ETS (Phase I) 
was launched in January 2013, covering one year only 
and exclusively CO2 emissions. In 2014 the ETS entered 
the second phase of operation (Phase II). 
 
Table 2: ETS Kazakhstan: development in phases 
Phase I (2013) Phase II (2014–2015) 
Emissions cap 147 MtCO2 155.4 MtCO2–2014 
153.0 MtCO2–2015 
Reduction targets 0% 0% –2011 
1.5% relative to 2012 
GHG CO2 emissions only 
Allocation 100% free alloca-
tion based on emis-
sions data of 2010 
Free allocation (0% and 
1.5% below 2011/2012 
average emissions) 
Sectors Energy sector (including, power production, oil 
and gas), mining and chemical industry above 
20,000 CO2/year threshold (phase I 2010; 
phase II years 2010 and 2012 emission levels) 
Companies 178 166 
Source: ICAP, 2016. 
 
In Phase I, the emission cap was set at 147 MtCO2, with 
reserves set at 20.6 MtCO2. By that time, the cap cov-
ered 55% of country’s GHG emissions, and 77% of the 
nation-wide CO2 emissions. The first National Allocation 
Plan 2013 covered 178 companies. Companies that were 
involved in Kazakhstan included sectors such as energy 
Energy
85%
Agriculture
8%
Waste
1%
Industrial
6%
Source: Own illustration based on UNFCCC, 2012.
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production, coal, mining, oil and gas, and industry (Table 3). 
There were no incentives to participate in the system, since 
compliance fines were abandoned in 2013. 
 
Table 3: ETS Kazakhstan: first phase 
Sectors Number of 
companies 
2010 CO2 
emissions 
(million 
tons) 
2013 allo-
cated carbon 
permits (mil-
lion tons) 
Power produc-
tion 
55 84 84 
Coal, mining, 
oil and gas 
69 19,08 19,08 
Industry 54 43,3 43,4 
 
Interestingly, in Phase II, while sectoral coverage stayed 
unchanged and less enterprises participated, more emis-
sions were allowed, with a very modest reduction target set. 
Accordingly, prices per ton of carbon on the Caspiy Com-
modity Exchange have been low, ranging from 20 to 1,650 
Kazakh tenge (0.09 to 7.5 US $) in 2014 and 2015, while 
the compliance penalty stood at Euro 30/tCO2. Also the 
trading activity was low: Throughout 2014, according to the 
Caspiy Commodity Exchange in total 40 trades took place. 
While carbon prices are too low to encourage investments 
in emission reduction, the handful of trades hardly justifies 
the institutional costs for maintaining trading infrastructure.  
 
Policy instruments: ETS versus tax 
While there is a general consensus that carbon pricing is 
an effective economic instrument to reduce GHG emis-
sions, outperforming formerly use of command-and-con-
trol, there is a longstanding scientific and policy debate 
about which policy instrument, emissions trading or a 
carbon tax is the most effective and appropriate one. 
Both instruments are based on economic incentives: By 
putting a price on carbon, they drive the change of pro-
ducers’ behavior, encourage them either to invest in 
green and clean technologies, or to substitute for lower 
carbon fuels and products, and thus to reduce GHG 
emissions. A third option is a hybrid model which in-
cludes features of both, carbon tax and ETS. However, 
in the context of a country with no prior experience of 
carbon pricing it is not recommended. 
As of 2015, 39 countries including developed and devel-
oping countries, and 23 subnational jurisdictions had im-
plemented one or the other mechanism of carbon pricing 
(World Bank and Ecofys, 2015). According to the Inter-
national Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) (2016), an 
ETS is implemented in 35 countries, 13 provinces/states 
and 7 cities. Hybrid schemes are implemented among 
others in Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, 
Finland and Portugal. 
An ETS (or often also referred to as ‘cap and trade’) is 
the preferred policy by many governments in the world. 
It is based on the principle that the market determines 
the carbon price, depending upon the supply and de-
mand of emissions allowances on the market. Govern-
ment regulatory authorities for a certain period of time 
determine absolute volumes of allowed emissions for en-
terprises covered by the scheme. Companies with lower 
emissions than set by this “cap” can sell their surplus 
emission allowances to companies that have higher 
emissions than permitted. If emissions of enterprises are 
lower than allowed, the carbon market is saturated and 
carbon prices are low – there is no incentive to further 
invest in reduction technologies (as it is the case for the 
EU ETS). If emissions of many enterprises are high or 
stay high due to inertia and lack of investment, the mar-
ket is nearly empty and carbon prices are high. When 
production rises in such a situation, emissions also rise 
and exceed limits set by the regulator. In an empty mar-
ket this puts business in a situation where it has to either 
buy costly allowances, pay high fines (that should be 
higher than carbon prices), or to make quick investment 
decisions to avoid surpassing limits in the given 
timeframe (if this is at short notice, this is no viable solu-
tion). If the company cannot pass these additional costs 
on to the consumer, it will reduce or better say – adapt – 
output to emission levels allowed.  
Moreover, marginal abatement costs (MAC) of individual 
enterprises determines the cost-effectiveness of the 
ETS. Under the ETS, enterprises with high MACs will find 
it more profitable to purchase additional emission allow-
ances, while enterprises with low marginal abatement 
costs will find it more profitable to sell allowances.  As 
trades take place, companies with initially high MAC 
move down the abatement cost curve, and companies 
with initially low MAC move up the abatement cost curve. 
In an ideal ETS, trade continues until MAC of all enter-
prises equals the market price of allowances. In their de-
cision-making on investments, enterprises need to know 
their abatement costs (cost of technology) and need to 
estimate future carbon costs alike. 
 
Table 4: ETS: strengths 
Emissions quantity certainty 
Extra revenues for companies in case of extra allowances 
Flexibility through buying and selling emissions 
Politically viable 
 
Table 4 lists some of the strengths of the ETS. A fully 
functioning ETS provides a certain predictability in 
terms of national levels of emission outcomes. These 
planned reductions are also reported to international or-
ganisations like the UNFCCC and depending on the 
countries participation status in the climate treaties, 
may become binding. The assumption of predictability 
of emissions holds in an ideal institutional world with a 
fully established trading system, reliable monitoring and 
verification of emissions, and strict handling of fines for 
non-compliance. If the world is less ideal, enterprises 
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may choose to comply by cheating, with de facto emis-
sions staying high. Recent literature emphasizes that 
the stringency of monitoring, reporting and verification 
has a particularly strong effect on the overall effective-
ness of the ETS. 
Bargaining between regulator and business takes place 
when allocation schemes for allowances are fixed by the 
regulator. If a time frame of 4 years applies, bargaining 
happens every 4 years, since the regulator is committing 
itself for this period. In the bargaining process, business 
may argue that production will rise, technology for reduc-
tion is costly or has a long investment phase and so on. 
Since the regulator is less informed than business itself, 
we have a situation of information asymmetry that puts 
business in a favorable position. This position is even 
stronger, if business is organized in well-functioning 
lobby groups or if politically well-connected entrepre-
neurs can assert direct influence on policy-making. Due 
to uncertainty of future developments, business will tend 
to argue for lower reductions to be on the safe side. 
Some of the major strengths of a carbon tax are listed in 
the Table 5. A carbon tax is implemented in far less coun-
tries. Here the governmental regulator sets a specific tax 
rate on every ton of CO2 emitted. However, the amount 
of emissions reduced is hard to predict, since it depends 
on the decision of the producer to either pay the tax or to 
reduce emissions.  
A carbon tax is easier to administer and to implement, 
does not require additional institutional infrastructure 
and thus implies less transaction costs. Administrative 
costs are smallest under a policy instrument covering 
upstream sectors of the economy, since it involves far 
less sources that have to be evaluated. For Sweden, 
which uses both carbon tax and the EU ETS, it has 
been shown, that that monitoring, reporting and verifi-
cation (MRV) costs under the EU ETS are higher than 
under a carbon tax.  
A significant amount of state revenue can be raised from 
a carbon tax. Revenues collected can be used to cut 
other distortionary taxes or to finance public goods, thus 
creating a so-called “double dividend” for environment 
and the economy alike. 
In the tax case, business has price certainty and can plan 
future investment based on the tax rate. Business has to 
make the same decisions as under an ETS – to pay the 
tax, to invest in saving technology, or to reduce output if 
higher prices cannot be passed on – but this takes place 
under price certainty.  
The bargaining between the regulator and business takes 
place before the tax rate is set, and when internationally 
binding obligations in climate treaties do not stand against, 
such national bargaining process can be repeated as 
soon and as frequently as the tax code and the legal sys-
tem allow for this. In the case of a carbon tax, the regulator 
did not commit itself for a certain period to reach a specific 
reduction outcome. Information asymmetry is the same as 
in an ETS. While no doubt there is more room for influenc-
ing the political process, there is also more flexibility to 
adapt the carbon price to new information. This may lower 
initial resistance of business groups. 
The key difference between both tools is that an ETS 
fixes the quantity of the overall national emission level, 
but the carbon price remains uncertain while a carbon 
tax fixes the carbon price and the quantity of emissions 
remains uncertain. Predictability in both cases depends 
on the availability and quality of information of all par-
ticipants. 
 
Table 5: Carbon tax: strengths 
Price certainty 
Easier to administer and enforce 
Utilizes existing institutional infrastructure 
Less transaction costs 
More transparent 
Provides additional government revenues 
Less susceptible to corruption and difficult to evade 
 
Contextualization of policy instruments 
While both instruments are generally assumed to be 
more effective than command and control instruments, 
the choice between the two policy options should be 
made considering the country’s economic, institutional 
and political context. We focus on the most constraining 
factors, admitting this is only one side of the story. 
First, regulative, institutional, human capital and financial 
capacities of a country should be considered. Here, a tax 
system is the clear favourite, since it already exists, in-
cluding systems of reporting and verification of emis-
sions. An ETS requires establishing and maintaining ad-
ditional infrastructure, an additional legal basis and 
human capital for trading infrastructure and market over-
sight. While the set-up of an ETS in Kazakhstan was re-
alized with the help of international organizations and in-
ternational consultants, at a certain point the system has 
to go through ownership transfer and run by the country 
itself, otherwise it stays in an institutional shell. The hint 
in a Kazakhstan-focused Project for Market Readiness 
Implementation Status Report of the World Bank (2015) 
that the ETS, especially benchmarking and methodol-
ogy, need to be fully understood and accepted by all 
stakeholders, and the following suspension of the ETS, 
seem to tell a story of failed ownership transfer. 
Second, enterprises in Kazakhstan are used to pay (or 
evade) taxes, but due to the lack of long-standing market 
experience enterprises are obviously not familiar with the 
handling of hardly to predict carbon prices in trading plat-
forms. Also, administrative hurdles are well-known in the 
country, but the necessity to participate in trading actions 
that cause additional transactions costs for monitoring, 
verification, carbon market observation and trading to 
keep their business running, is a new and costly thing. An 
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import factor is knowledge about abatement costs – when 
technologies have to be imported, search and transaction 
costs for substitution arise and make investment decisions 
costly. Hence (and like in the EU ETS), business tries to 
evade emission trades as far as possible. 
Third, market imperfections should be taken into consid-
eration such as the oligopolistic nature of the energy sec-
tor in Kazakhstan, which is also the largest source of CO2 
emissions. Energy producers might restrict output below 
customers demand, which for energy is neither socially 
nor economically a desired outcome. Regarding the in-
dustry sector as the second largest source of emissions, 
the enterprises participating in the ETS due to their large 
size are of high importance for the local economies. 
Thus, the biggest polluters in Kazakhstan are in an ex-
tremely strong bargaining position against the regulator. 
Of course this is the same in the case of a tax – but taxes 
can be handled with greater flexibility over time. If we add 
the human factor of past and present times, bargaining 
might be culturally closer while social pressure from af-
fected local population on local politics is on the rise. 
Forth, corruption is still widely prevalent in Kazakhstan, 
and it might well play a role during the bargaining, but also 
in verification and monitoring. The more institutions in-
volved, the more the system is prone to (eventually cumu-
lative) corruption. Corruption has been often mentioned by 
international organizations and researchers as reducing 
the quality of environmental governance and the effective-
ness of especially emission trading. Recent literature em-
phasizes that though a carbon taxation system is also vul-
nerable to criminal and corruption cases, an ETS system 
is especially susceptible to corruption due to its construc-
tion. Widespread corruption cases in the ETS systems 
have already raised questions regarding effectiveness of 
an ETS. A number of cases of fraudulent activities in the 
EU ETS, including re-sale and misreporting of used car-
bon offsets and value-added tax frauds have raised con-
cerns over functioning of the EU ETS and around the 
world (UNEP, 2013). Moreover, corruption can disrupt 
GHG market prices and impact integrity of GHG emis-
sions reporting (Sweeney et.al, 2011). Against the back-
ground presented in Figure 3, this makes a clear case for 
the carbon tax to be the preferred solution in Kazakhstan. 
 
Figure 3: Control of corruption index China, Kazakhstan 
and Germany 
 
Conclusion 
Country-specific circumstances should be taken into ac-
count as constraining factors while choosing an appro-
priate policy instrument to reduce emissions. An ETS is 
efficient and effective in countries with strong institutions, 
low information asymmetry, long market traditions, and 
low market concentration, but it may be unviable under 
circumstances that are less ideal, as the experience of 
Kazakhstan shows. Here, a carbon tax seems to be the 
more appropriate instrument. 
In a broader perspective, one could argue that applying 
monetary incentive schemes while core agents hold very 
strong bargaining positions is no solution for the climate 
change policy problem. Shifting the focus towards miti-
gation efforts like the introduction of higher energy effi-
ciency standards or the promotion of renewables might 
be more promising for the required quick success in 
emissions reduction. In the longer run, these efforts will 
weaken the bargaining positions of countervailing actors 
and pave the way towards an effective ETS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration based on World Bank Data.
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